In his last report as the US Special Inspector General of Reconstruction of Afghanistan, John Sopko highlighted the factors that participated in US failure in Afghanistan. One of the main reasons for this was American ignorance of Afghan society and culture.
Like the Americans, Pakistan did not know the reality of Afghanistan, nor did it ignore it, especially after the collapse of the monarchy in 1973, when the struggle for power collided in the Soviet invasion in 1979 and Terrorism over war, and war, and war, they affected the social political dynamics in every country, especially in the Pak-Afghan border as well as in the Pukhtoon population.
Jihadist and sectarian streams combined with other extremist/ militant groups and international networks such as al -Qaeda. Under the Taliban rule in the 1990s, Afghanistan became a center for some people, home for others, and a flagship for all. When they lost power, the Taliban’s battle also became their battle. If Pakistan supported the Taliban at that time, whether or not it did not, it supported extremists, including the Pakistani Taliban. It was a disaster prediction.
The history, culture, race, social institutions and religion of Afghanistan formally connect it to the neighborhood, especially Pakistan. Since its inception, the Taliban (formerly) has been quite presence in FATA and Balochistan, and have used Pakistani Madrasis to recruit fighters. The Taliban allegedly opened Quetta Madrasa for about 10 years by the Taliban, Amir Habitullah Akhundzada. In this way, the Taliban were never completely an Afghan trend.
Afghanistan is not the only problem.
The ignorance or denial of this fact and its implications for Pakistan were not the monopoly of the security establishment. The wider strategic community, and major media parties, and political leadership, which was overwhelmed by negative sentiments about the United States – which was the result of the Afghan war and the war on terror – its ‘nationalist’ sentiment and ” Expressed Independent foreign policy, in praising the Afghan Taliban, which was seen as the image of resistance to a superpower, whose ‘chains of slavery’ were eventually broken by them. That is the same existence today, half of Afghanistan’s population – women – a cruel irony.
It became clear that the Taliban would return. But Pakistan’s policy makers rarely realized that this time the Taliban 2.0 would be less isolated. As the only game in the city, they will be the only hope for Afghanistan’s stability – instability in the country, can leave international terrorists and extremists, which pose a threat to regional peace. Due to the low dependence on Pakistan, the Taliban had to take advantage of Islamabad because they had already deepened their roots in the tribal areas. They would get the support of it, and did not need to earn it. Many decades of dealing with the establishment gave them a good measure of Islamabad’s security dilemma. They knew that by betting them, Pakistan had painted itself in a corner.
The Taliban are taking advantage of Pakistan’s backward position. There are many reasons for not taking Kabul’s action against TTP, a principal wants a Taliban to not be considered proxy. They benefit from their support for the TTP and the Baloch insurgency, help them maintain their sovereignty, and give them freedom to reach India, thus their turmoil about Islamabad. Increases.
The Taliban do not want any change along the border of Pakistan-Afghanistan, which has become practically open border due to decades of Taliban infusion. Stagnation helps with economic exchange in the area, and helps the Taliban maintain its influence, while Durand refuses the Line as an international border. Pakistan wants a common border with passport control and trade sanctions. But the Taliban are resisting it, which causes border tension.
It is clear that instability arises when intelligence, policy and politics are attached to a problem and is monopolized by an organization and this problem is viewed only through security lenses. Afghanistan is not the only problem. It is affected and affected by Pakistan’s political stability and internal security, and the possibility of regional cooperation is all essential for the country’s economic development and its future.
Thus Afghanistan is as a domestic issue as the foreign policy challenge. And one’s resolution depends on others’ resolution. It will not be fast and easy. Pakistan should revise its foreign policy -making process after another catastrophe.
Author, a former ambassador, visits a senior research fellow at the National University of Singapore, Professor Georgetown University and Singapore.
Dawn, appeared on February 11, 2025
